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1. Introduction
Franz	Brentano’s	Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkt	 has	 inspired	
the	 development	 of	 first-order	 or	 self-representational	 theories	 of	
consciousness.1	Such	 theories	hold	 that	a	mental	event	or	process	 is	






views,	 consciousness	 of	 a	 mental	 phenomenon	 consists	 in,	 broadly	
speaking,	a	representation	of	it.	But	only	the	self-representational	view	
has	it	that	it	is	intrinsic	to	a	mental	phenomenon	that	it	is	represented.	





Let	 us	 start	 by	 outlining	 the	 objection	 that	 calls	 for	 a	 response	




[C]onsider	 the	 case	of	 thinking	about	x	 or	 attending	 to	
x.	In	the	presence	of	thinking	about	x	there	is	already	an	
1.	 Smith	 (1986,	 150ff)	 takes	Brentano	 to	provide	 a	model	 for	 the	 structure	of	
consciousness.	See	also	his	2004,	86–9.	Janzen	2008,	chapt.	6;	Kriegel	2003a,	
b	and	c;	and	Hossack	2002	take	Brentano	as	a	starting	point	in	developing	




ness.	 Kosman	 1975	 relates	Aristotle’s	 view	 to	Moore’s	 and	 Sartre’s.	 Caston	
(2002,	768ff)	develops	a	reading	of	Aristotle’s	view	of	consciousness	that	is	
inspired	by	 the	work	of	Brentano	and	his	 student	Hermann	Schell.	 For	an	
overview	of	work	on	Aristotle’s	view	on	consciousness,	see	Johansen	2005.
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The	Contrarian	objection	has	force	only	if	the	self-representational	




are	always	of	 something	else,	but	of	 themselves	on	 the	
side	[en parergo].	(Metaphysics	12.9) 
When	we,	for	example,	hear	a	note,	we	are	aware	of	our	hearing	the	
note,	but	only	 “on	 the	 side”.	Talk	of	perceiving	one’s	mental	activity	
“on	 the	side”	 suggests	 that	 someone	who	 loses	himself,	 for	example,	
in	a	painting	 is	 still	 aware	of	his	perceiving,	but	 in	a	way	 that	does	
not	“register”	with	the	perceiver.	Brentano	ranks	therefore	the	objects	




motivated	 answer	 why	 (a)	 one’s	 current	 mental	 act	 can	 only	 be	
the	 secondary	 object	 of	 this	mental	 act	 and	 (b)	why	 the	 secondary	
object	is	not	noticed	by	the	thinker.	The	thrust	of	Brentano’s	answer	
is	 conveyed	 by	 the	 slogan	 ‘Inner	 perception	 (awareness)	 can	 never	
become	 observation’.6	 Ryle’s	 Concept of Mind	 contains	 echoes	 of	
Brentano’s	slogan.7	Ryle	distinguishes	in	perceptions	a	non-intentional	
constituent,	sensation,	and	argues	on	the	basis	of	grammatical	points	
a	 higher-order	 thought,	 and	 that	 thought	 is	 usually	 not	 itself	 a	 conscious	
thought”.	However,	 according	 to	 (one	 understanding	 of)	 the	 transparency	
thesis,	we	don’t	focus	on	the	sensory	state,	but	its	object,	the	colour,	sound	
etc.	 Hence,	 the	 transparency	 phenomenon	 also	 poses	 a	 challenge	 for	 the	
higher-order	view.	How	can	the	sensory	state	be	the	object	of	a	higher-order	
presentation	and	yet	escape	one’s	notice?















Contrarians,	 in	 turn,	 argue	 that	 it	 seems	 to	us	 that	our	 conscious	




attending	 to	 a	 play	 or	 the	 task	 of	 building	 a	 bookcase.	
(Gennaro	2008,	49)
It	often	seems	to	be	the	case	that	(i)	one	is	absorbed	in	a	perceptual	
activity	 such	 as	 perceiving	 a	 painting,	 (ii)	 one	 is	 still	 consciously	
perceiving	 the	 painting,	 but	 (iii)	 since	 one	 is	 absorbed	 in	 one’s	
















to	 it	 in	 the	most	 proper	 sense”;	 one	 is	 not	 turned	 to	 one’s	 hearing	
of	 the	 tone.	 Now	 what	 does	 ‘turned	 to	 in	 the	 most	 proper	 sense’	
mean?	 In	order	 to	answer	 this	question,	we	need	 to	get	clear	about	
what	Brentano	means	by	‘zu gewandt’.	 ‘x ist y zu gewendet’	has	several	
meanings	in	German.	One	of	them	is	that	x	is	in	some	sense	oriented	











perceive	A	 and	B,	 but	 only	A	 engages	 our	 attention,	B	 escapes	 our	
notice.	 Take	 reading	 a	 sentence	 with	 understanding	 as	 a	 model.	
Reading	a	sentence	with	understanding	has	two	sides:	 it	consists	of	
the	 apprehension	 of	 the	meaning	 of	 the	words	 expressed	 and	 of	 a	
perceiving	 of	 the	 sentence	 inscription,	 the	 physical	 object.	 Reading	









that	one	cannot	observe	a	 sensation.	 If	one	says	 that	one	observes	a	
glimpse,	one	commits	a	category	mistake.8
In	this	paper	I	will	expound	the	view	that	is	expressed	in	Brentano’s	
slogan	 and	 assess	 his	 arguments	 for	 holding	 it.	 This	 project	 is	 of	
independent	philosophical	interest	because	Brentano’s	view	promises	
to	 shed	 light	 on	 the	 distinctive	 character	 of	 awareness.	 I	will	 argue	
that	the	arguments	Brentano	provides	in	Psychologie	are	unconvincing	
(see	sections	4	and	5).	Nonetheless	one	can	extract	 from	Brentano’s	
writings	 on	 descriptive	 psychology	 a	 promising	 argument	 for	 the	




between	 mental	 activities.	 Awareness	 cannot	 become	 observation,	
because	mere	awareness	of	a	mental	phenomenon	cannot	contrast	it	
with	others.
2. Brentano on primary and secondary object 
According	to	Brentano,	every	mental	act	such	as	hearing	a	note,	smelling	
a	smell,	seeing	a	colour	etc.	 is	directed	on	itself	on	the	side.	For	the	







object.	 […]	The	act	of	hearing	 the	 tone	 is	 turned	 to	 the	
tone	 in	 the	 most	 proper	 sense	 [im eigentlichsten Sinne 
zugewandt],	and	in	being	so	turned	it	seems	to	grasp	itself	
on	 the	 side	 [nebenbei]	 and	 as	 an	 added	 extra	 [Zugabe].	
(1874,	180	[98],	in	part	my	translation.)
8.	 See,	for	example,	Ryle	1949,	197.





are	 directed	 toward	 that	 object.	 Thus	 the	 observation	
of	 physical	 phenomena	 in	 external	 perception,	 while	
offering	 us	 a	 basis	 for	 knowledge	 of	 nature,	 can	 at	 the	
same	 time	 become	 a	means	 of	 attaining	 knowledge	 of	
the	 mind.	 Indeed,	 turning	 one’s	 attention	 to	 physical	
phenomena	in	our	imagination	is,	if	not	the	only	source	
of	 our	 knowledge	 of	 laws	 governing	 the	mind,	 at	 least	
the	immediate	and	principal	source.	(Brentano	1874,	41–2	
[22].	In	part	my	translation,	my	emphasis.)
Inner	 perception	 or	 awareness,	 says	 Brentano,	 neither	 is	 nor	 can	
become	observation.	I	will	call	this	claim	the	Awareness ≠ Observation 
Thesis,	in	short	the	A ≠ O Thesis.	In	contrast,	outer	perception	(seeing,	
hearing,	smelling)	can	become	observation.	For	example,	my	hearing	
the	song	of	the	birds	can	become	listening	to	the	birdsong,	that	is,	an	





inscription.	The	A ≠ O Thesis	grounds	Brentano’s	distinction	between	
primary	and	secondary	object.	 If	Brentano	 is	 right,	a	mental	act	can	
neither	 be	 nor	 become	 its	 own	 primary	 object;	 it	 can	 only	 be	 its	
secondary	object,	that	is,	we	are	aware	of	it,	but	we	cannot	observe	it.	



























It is a peculiar feature of inner perception [die innere 
Wahrnehmung hat das Eigentümliche] that it can never 
become inner observation.	Objects	which	one,	as	one	puts	it,	
perceives	outwardly	can	be	observed;	one	focuses	one’s	
attention	 completely	 on	 them	 in	 order	 to	 apprehend	
them	precisely	[genau].	But with objects of inner perception 











We	 say	 that	 one	 pays	 attention	 [aufmerken]	 where	 we	
desire	 to	 notice	 [bemerken]	 something	 that	 happens	
or	 will	 happen	 in	 us	 and	 arguably	 also	 to	 memorize	
it	 [merken]	 and	 where	 this	 desire	 drives	 us	 to	 create	
favourable	 dispositions	 for	 this;	 one	 can	 therefore	 say	
that	we	aspire	to	notice.	(Brentano	1890/1,	35	[38],	in	part	
my	translation.)
Brentano	 is	 concerned	 here	with	 directing	 one’s	 attention	 on	 one’s	










it	 from	 the	 other	 sounds.	 This	 desire	 drives	me	 to	 create	 favorable	
conditions	for	its	satisfaction.	We	mark	the	transition	from	hearing	the	
song	to	hearing	out	of	the	desire	to	hear	more	of	the	song	or	hear	it	
better	by	saying	that	I	start	 listening to	and	 listening out for	 it.	When	I	
start	 to	 listen	to	the	birdsong,	 the	perceptual	activity	and	the	ability	
exercised	are	still	the	same:	I	am	hearing	the	song	of	the	bird.	But	I	am	
hearing	it	now	out	of	the	desire	to	learn	more	about	it.
As	 a	 general	 account	 of	 what	 it	 is	 to	 turn	 one’s	 attention	 to	 an	
object,	 Brentano’s	 proposal	 is	 too	 narrow.	 Bradley	 (1902,	 4)	 gives	
the	 examples	 of	 attentively	 listening	 to	 an	 air	 and	 paying	 attention	




observer	 [in ähnlicher Weise wie ein Beobachtender].	 (1874,	
181	[99].	My	translation.)
Why	only	 “similar	 to	 an	observer”	 and	not	 simply	 “as	 an	observer”?	
Brentano	argues	that	memory	can	deceive	us.	But	the	same	is	true	of	






the	 assumption	 that	 awareness	 cannot	 become	 observation	 to	 the	
conclusion	that	mental	acts	cannot	be	observed	at	all.	





Not	all	objects	one	attends	to	are	objects	one has turned one’s attention 
to.	 (See	Brentano	 1890/1,	 36	 [38–9].)12	An	object	may	 capture	one’s	
attention	against one’s will.	If	an	acrobat	performs	breathtaking	stunts	
during	 a	 biology	 lecture,	 she	 will	 capture	 the	 audience’s	 attention,	
although	they	ought	to	and	want	to	focus	their	attention	on	the	plant	
they	are	studying.	
This	 example	 gives	 us	 a	 first	 pointer	 as	 to	 what	 focusing	 one’s	
attention	amounts	to.	One	turns	one’s	attention	to	something	if	one	
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4. Brentano’s intuitive consideration 
When	expounding	the	A ≠ O Thesis,	Brentano	gives	an	example	that	
will	resonate	with	many	of	his	readers:
[The	 fact	 that	 awareness	 neither	 is	 nor	 can	 become	
observation]	 is	 especially	 clear	 with	 respect	 to	 certain	
mental	phenomena	such	as	anger	[Zorn].	For	if	someone	
wants	 to	 observe	 the	 anger	 which	 rages	 in	 him,	 the	






The	example	is	supposed	to	make	the	A ≠ O Thesis	initially	plausible;	
it	 is	not	 intended	 to	provide	 the	 true	 reason	 for	 the	 thesis.	Such	an	
explanatory	argument	will	be	possible	only	after	Brentano	has	argued	
that	 consciousness	 of	 a	mental	 act	—	 say,	 consciousness	 of	 hearing	
F —	and	hearing	F	are	not	two	distinct	mental	acts.	I	will	elaborate	this	
point	in	the	next	section.	
How	 does	 this	 intuitive	 consideration	 work?	 Imagine	 that	 you	
have	a	fit	of	road	rage.	If	you	are	raging	with	anger,	you	are	aware	of	
your	anger,	but	you	cannot	observe	it.	Why?	When	I	am	raging	with	
anger,	 I	 “cannot	 think	of	 anything	else”	but	 the	object	 to	which	my	
anger	 is	 directed,	 say,	 the	 careless	 driver.	 In	 this	 situation,	 I	 cannot	
form	the	desire	or	the	intention	required	to	turn	my	awareness	of	my	
14.	 I	 have	 re-translated	 the	 passage.	 The	 reason	 is	 that	 Brentano’s	 translators	
render	 the	 crucial	 sentence	 ‘Denn wer den Zorn, der in ihm glüht, beobachten 










it”,	 but	 that	 the	 knowledge	 is	 in	 a	 “wide	 sense”	 theoretical	 or	 ideal.	
However,	Bradley’s	“wide	sense”	only	names	the	problem	to	be	solved.	
Brentano’s	work	on	 aesthetic	 value	points	 one	 in	 the	direction	of	 a	
more	satisfying	answer:	One	can	merely	hear	an	air	or	listen	to	it	out	of	
the	desire	to	respond	adequately	to	its	aesthetic	value.	I	will,	however,	
not	 try	 to	 complete	 the	 account	 of	 attention	 under	 consideration	
here.	For	if	Brentano	has	a	good	reason	that	inner	perception	cannot	
become	observation,	 this	 reason	will	 also	 apply	 to	 the	 aesthetic,	 or	
more	generally,	value	case.13 




can	distinguish	two	potential	reasons	for	the	A ≠ O Thesis:	




because	 the	desire	 to	 know	 the	object	 of	 one’s	 current	
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experience therefore eludes introspection — as soon as we 
turn our attention to it, it goes out of existence and is replaced 










our	 enquiry.	 This,	 indeed,	 is	 common	 to	 almost	 every	
operation	of	mind	[…].	(Reid	1785,	62,	my	emphasis.)





impossible	 because	 the	 phenomenon	 disappears,	 it	 is	
clear	that	an	earlier	state	of	excitement	can	no	longer	be	
interfered	with	in	this	way.	(Brentano	1874,	49	[26])






of	 raging	 anger	 neither	 requires	 forming	 an	 intention	nor	 having	 a	












not	 the	 same	 anger	 as	 the	 consuming	 one?	 Consider	 an	 analogy:	
There	 is	 a	mosquito	buzzing	 round	very	 (very)	 fast.	 Because	of	 the	
speed	of	its	movement,	I	cannot	focus	my	visual	attention	on	it.	But	
when	the	mosquito	comes	to	rest,	I	can	and	do	observe	it.	In	this	case	
I	 can	observe	 the	object	 that	was	previously	unobservable,	because	
it	 has	 lost	 a	 property,	moving	 around	 extremely	 quickly,	 that	made	




Kriegel	 (forthcoming)	 tries	 to	 close	 this	 loophole	 in	 Brentano’s	
argument:
If	one	has	the	presence	of	mind	to	attend	to	one’s	anger,	
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A	 similar	 question	 arises	 for	 Kriegel’s	 reconstruction	 of	 the	
argument.	He	 relies	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 every	mental	 act	 has	 a	
phenomenal	 intensity.	 In	Psychologie,	Brentano	 indeed	holds	 that	all	
mental	acts	have	an	 intensity	and	 tentatively	 identifies	 the	 intensity	
of	 a	 judgement	with	 a	 degree	 of	 confidence.	 (See	 1874,	 192	 [105].)	
Our	question	becomes	therefore:	Why should the degree of confidence of 
a judgement change if one also desires to learn more about this judgement?	It	
seems	to	me	that	I	can	judge	with	the	same	degree	of	confidence	that	
p	whether	I	have	this	desire	or	not.	
In	 The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong	 (1889,	 57–8),	
Brentano	 rejects	 this	 view	 of	 judgemental	 intensity.	 It	 is	 not	 clear	
whether	 (a)	Brentano	wants	 to	 reject	 the	 idea	 that	 judgements	 and	
other	mental	acts	have	intensity,	or	(b)	he	merely	changes	his	mind	
about	what	this	intensity	consists	in.	But	in	the	Appendix	of	the	1911	
edition,	 he	 opts	 for	 (a).	 Prima facie,	 a	 presentation	 of	 the	 number	
3	has	no	 intensity.	 (See	 1911,	 139	 [223].)	To	conclude:	By	Brentano’s	
own	 lights,	 the	 premises	 of	 the	 argument	 under	 consideration	 are	
not	general	enough	to	sustain	the	conclusion	that	no	mental	act	can	
become	observation	of	itself.
5. The Argument from the Nature of Observation





mental	 phenomenon;	 it	 is	 only	 by	 considering	 it	 in	 its	
relation	to	two	different	objects,	one	of	which	is	a	physical	
phenomenon	 and	 the	 other	 a	 mental	 phenomenon,	
that	 we	 divide	 it	 conceptually	 into	 two	 presentations.	
(Brentano	1874,	179	[98].	In	part	my	translation.)
This	conclusion	is	supposed	to	be	the	key	to	the	A ≠ O Thesis:
Brentano	proposes	now,	in	line	with	Reid,	that	one	can	come	to	desire	
to	 learn	 more	 about	 one’s	 raging	 anger,	 but	 the	 acquisition	 of	 the	
desire	“interferes”	with	the	object	of	the	intended	observation.	
But	 the	claim	that	 the	attempt	 to	observe	a	mental	phenomenon	
extinguishes	 it	 is	 plausible	 only	 for	 “almost	 every	 operation	 of	 the	
mind”	(Reid	1785,	62).	A	passion	is	changed	if	one	acquires	a	desire	to	
observe	it.	A	desire	is	itself	a	conative	mental	phenomenon	that	may	
interfere	 with	 or	 extinguish	 another	 conative	 mental	 phenomenon.	
But	the	A ≠ O Thesis	is	not	restricted	to	conative	mental	phenomena.	








which	 require	 less	 concentration	 on	 the	 matter,	 can,	
already	 while	 they	 take	 place,	 simultaneously	 become	
to	a	certain	extent	the	object	of	our	observing.	We	must	
then	simply	divide	our	attention.	Consequently	neither	
the	 function	nor	 the	observation	will	 be	perfect,	 but	 it	
will	not	be	completely	impossible	and	will	be	combined	
with	 the	 just-past	 part	 of	 the	 function	 to	 form	 one	
complete	 impression	 of	 the	 experience.	 (Stumpf	 1939,	
350.	My	translation.)
Why	should,	 for	 instance,	my	desire	to	learn	more	about	inferring	p	
from	p	&	q	 interrupt	or	 interfere	with	my	inferring?	Prima facie,	 this	
desire	and	my	 inference	 can	co-exist.	Please	note	 that	 the	 idea	 that	
one	 can	 divide	 one’s	 attention	 plays	 an	 important	 role	 in	 Stumpf’s	
argument.	I	will	come	back	to	this	in	the	next	section.
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observation	of	one’s	own	observing	or	any	other	of	one’s	
own	mental	 acts	 is	 possible.	We	 can	observe	 the	 tones	
we	hear,	but	we	cannot	observe	our	hearing	of	the	tones,	
for	 the	 hearing	 is	 only	 co-apprehended	 [mit erfasst]	 in	
the	hearing	of	the	sounds.	(1874,	181–2,	[99].	In	part	my	
translation.)
A	 first-stab	 reconstruction	 of	 this	 Argument	 from	 the	 Nature	 of	
Observation	is	as	follows:
If	M	 is	an	act	of	observing	x	and	x	≠ M, M	 cannot	also	
observe	M.


















Therefore:	 Any	 act	 of	 observing	 M
1








“yes,”	 for	 where	 would	 we	 have	 got	 the	 concepts	 of	
presentation	 and	 thought	 without	 such	 perception?	
On	the	other	hand,	it	is	obvious	that	we	are	not	able	to	
observe	 our	 present	mental	 phenomena.	 But	 how	 can	
we	explain	this,	if	not	by	the	fact	that	we	are	incapable	
of	 perceiving	 them?	 Previously,	 in	 fact,	 no	 other	
explanation	 seemed	 possible,	 but	 now we see the true 
reason clearly. The presentation which accompanies a mental 
act and refers to it is part of the object on which it is directed.	
(1874,	181	[99].	My	emphasis.)
I	will	not	rehearse	the	argument	to	which	Brentano	appeals,	but	simply	
assess	whether	one	can	derive	from	its	conclusion	the	A ≠ O Thesis.	He	
continues	as	follows:
If	 an	 inner presentation	 were	 ever	 to	 become	 inner	
observation,	 this	 observation	 would	 be	 directed	 upon	
itself.	Even	the	defenders	of	inner	observation,	however,	
seem	to	consider	this	impossible.	[…]	
One	 observation	 is	 supposed	 to	 be	 capable	 of	 being	
directed	 upon	 another	 observation,	 but	 not	 upon	 itself.	
The	truth	is	that	something	which is only the secondary object 
of an act	can	undoubtedly	be	an	object	of	consciousness	
in	 this	act,	but	cannot	be	an	object	of	observation	 in	 it.	
Observation	requires	that	one	turns	to	the	object	as	the	
primary	one.	Hence,	a	mental	act	obtaining	 in	us	could	
only	 be	 observed	 in	 a	 second,	 simultaneous	 act	 which	
turns	 to	 it	 as	 its	 primary	 object.	 But	 the	 accompanying	
inner	 idea	 does	 in	 fact	 not	 belong	 to	 a	 second	mental	
act.	 [Aber die begleitende Vorstellung gehört eben nicht zu 
einem zweiten Akte.]	 Thus	 we	 see	 that	 no	 simultaneous	




6. A closer look at the secondary object of consciousness
In	 order	 to	 bring	 out	 the	 reason	 why	 awareness	 cannot	 become	
observation,	 we	 need	 first	 to	 highlight	 an	 important	 feature	 of	
Brentano’s	 view	 of	 awareness	 that	 is	 overlooked	 in	 the	 literature.	
He	 himself	 frequently	 talks	 as	 if	 descriptive	 psychology	 starts	 with	
individual	mental	acts	such	that	each	of	them	has	one	primary	object	















acts.	There is only one secondary object!
Why?	Consider	an	example.	When	I	simultaneously	see	a	colour,	
taste	 chocolate	 and	 hear	 a	 melody,	 I	 am	 co-conscious	 of	 seeing	 a	
colour,	 tasting	 chocolate	 and	 hearing	 a	 melody.	 These	 activities	




















of	 something	 distinct	 from	 itself,	 it	 cannot	 also	 observe	 itself	 and	
therefore	be	its	own	primary	object.	For	instance,	listening	to	a	tone	
cannot	also	be	an	observation	of	itself.
Brentano’s	 Argument	 from	 the	 Nature	 of	 Observation	 can	 be	
attacked	on	two	points.	
First,	(OB2)	needs	further	support.	Why,	for	example,	can	a	mental	
act	 only	 have	 one	 primary	 object?	Mill	 (1865,	 64)	 pointed	 out	 that	
one	can	divide	one’s	attention:	one	can	attend	to	some	things	at	the	
same	 time.	 In	 the	 previous	 section,	 Stumpf	 appealed	 to	 the	 same	
idea.	 If	 one	 can	divide	one’s	 attention,	why	 should	one	not	be	able	
to	simultaneously	attend	to	one’s	perceiving	and	its	object?	Brentano	
needs	a	reason	to	rule	out	that	a	mental	act	can	have	several	primary	
objects,	 among	 them	 itself.	However,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 see	what	 this	
reason	 might	 be.	 Prima facie,	 we	 can	 divide	 our	 attention	 between	
different	activities.
Second,	 Brentano	 assumes	 that	 observing	 has	 a	 primary	 object	
distinct	from	itself.	Under	this	assumption	his	conclusion	follows.	But	




To	 sum	 up:	 This	 and	 the	 previous	 section	 suggest	 that	 the	 first	
potential	reason	for	the	A ≠ O Thesis	gets	Brentano	some,	but	not	all,	
of	the	way.	We	need	therefore	to	find	a	different	reason	for	the	A ≠ O 
19.	 Thanks	to	a	referee	for	helping	me	to	improve	the	presentation	of	this	point.




The	 secondary	 object	 is	 a	 whole	 comprising	 all	 simultaneous	
mental	acts.	But	might	one	not	also	say	that	there	is	only	one	primary	






difference	 between	 the	 primary	 and	 secondary	 object.	 For	 only	 the	
parts	of	the	secondary	object	appear	to	us	as	a	unity:
We	emphasized	as	a	distinguishing	characteristic	[of	the	
mental]	 the	 fact	 that	 the	mental	 phenomena	which	we	
perceive,	 in	 spite	of	 all	 their	multiplicity,	always	 appear	



















of	 references	 and	 a	 plurality	 of	 objects.]	 [A]s	 I	 have	
already	 emphasized	 in	 my	 Psychology from an Empirical 
Standpoint,	however,	one should not single out one of these 
relations to be the secondary object, for example, the mental 
relation to the primary object.	This,	as	it	can	easily	be	seen,	
will	lead	to	infinite	regress,	for	there	would	have	to	be	a	
third	reference,	which	would	have	to	have	the	secondary	
reference	 as	 object;	 a	 fourth,	 which	 would	 have	 the	
additional	 third	one	as	object;	and	so	on.	The secondary 
object is not one of the mental references, but the mental 
activity, or more precisely, the mentally active thing, in which 




























This	 sets	 the	 task	 for	 descriptive	 psychology.	 Just	 as	 anatomy	
distinguishes	 in	 a	 body	 parts,	 descriptive	 psychology	 distinguishes	
in	the	unarticulated	unity	of	consciousness	parts	and	identifies	their	
relations.	Descriptive	psychology	is,	in	Brentano’s	(1890/1,	128	[135])	


















Why	 are	we	 aware	 of	 a	 unity	 and	 not	 an	 articulated	whole?	We	
can	 answer	 this	 question	 by	 comparing	 the	 objects	 of	 awareness	
with	 those	 of	 outer	 perception.	 The	 latter	 may	 be	 given	 to	 you	
simultaneously	as	parts	of	a	whole,	but,	as	Brentano	claims,	they	don’t	
“appear	 in	 the	 same	way	as	parts	of	 a	 single	phenomenon”.	 Imagine	
that	you	simultaneously	see	and	hear	a	trio	playing.	In	your	perception	





In	 contrast,	 in	 consciousness	 there	 is	 no	 spatial	 order	 such	 that	
each	of	several	co-conscious	objects	appears	to	us	distinctly.	Brentano	








in	 space.	Consider	 for	 illustration	 his	 example.	He	 pictures	 himself	
writing	near	a	babbling	brook:	
The	sound	of	 the	brook	near	which	 I	write,	 the	odor	of	
the	 cedars,	 the	 feeling	 of	 satisfaction	 with	 which	 my	
breakfast	 has	 filled	me,	 and	my	 interest	 in	writing	 this	









it	 is	 sufficient	 to	 say	 that	 it	 is	 a	 non-propositional	 attitude:	 one	
acknowledges	an	object	if,	and	only	if,	one	thinks	of	it	in	a	way	that	
commits	 one	 to	 its	 existence	 without	 predicating	 the	 property	 of	
existence	of	it.
Awareness	consists	in	acknowledgement	of	a	whole	that	is	composed	
of	 all	 simultaneous	mental	 acts	 of	 a	 thinker.	We	 acknowledge	 this	
whole	without	 acknowledging	 each	 part.	 Consider	 hearing	 a	 chord	
for	 illustration.	 I	can	hear	 the	notes	of	 the	chord	together,	but	none	
of	 them	 “stands	 out”	 in	my	 auditory	 experience.	With	 this	 in	mind	
we	 can	 explain	 Brentano’s	 distinction	 between	 explicit perception,	 or	
noticing,	and	implicit perception.	If	one	acknowledges	the	whole	{A, B}, 
one	 thereby	perceives	A	 implicitly	and	B	 implicitly:	one	hears	 them	
together,	without	hearing	A	and	hearing	B.	In	Brentano’s	own	words:	
A	clarification	of	this	distinction	[explicit	versus	implicit	
perception]	 seems	 to	 be	 desirable.	 Perception	 is	 an	
acknowledgement.	And	if	the	accepted	thing	is	a	whole	
with	 parts,	 then	 the	 parts	 are	 all,	 in	 a	 certain	 manner,	
co-accepted	 [mitanerkannt].	 The	 denial	 of	 any	 of	 them	
would	 contradict	 the	 whole.	 Yet	 the	 individual	 part	 is,	




A	and	acknowledges B,	one	notices A	and	one	notices B	in	{A,	B}	or	one	
apperceives	them	(and	vice versa).25




When	a	 red	 ivory	ball,	 seen	 for	 the	first	 time,	has	been	
withdrawn,	 it	 will	 leave	 a	 mental	 representation	 of	
itself,	 in	 which	 all	 that	 it	 simultaneously	 gave	 us	 will	
indistinguishably	co-exist.	Let	a	white	ball	succeed	to	it;	
now,	and	not	before,	will	an	attribute	detach	 itself,	and	
the	 color,	 by	 force	 of	 contract,	 be	 shaken	 out	 into	 the	
foreground.	(Martineau	1860,	271)
One	cannot	 see	a	 colour	 in	 the	 sense	of	 a	particular	 colour	 trope	 if	
one	does	not	see	the	spatial	extension	it	fills.	And	one	cannot	see	a	
particular	 spatial	 extension	 without	 a	 colour	 filling	 it.	 Both	 colour	
and	 spatial	 extension	 are	 jointly	 given	 in	 one’s	 perception;	 neither	
of	 them	stands	out.	However,	 if	 the	 joint	perception	of	 redness	and	
spatial	extension	 is	 followed	by	a	 joint	perception	of	whiteness	and	
spatial	 extension,	whiteness	 and	 redness	 both	will	 be	 “shaken	 into	
the	 foreground”;	 the	 contrast	between	 them	makes	both	noticeable.	
Similar	examples	can	be	given	for	other	sense	modalities.	Martineau’s	
examples	makes	plausible	 that	when	we	perceive	 several	 objects	A, 
B	 and	C	 jointly,	A	will	 stand	out	 and	be	 an	object	of	 attention	 if	 in	




law of dissociation by varying concomitants.	It	applies	to	our	awareness	of	
our	mental	life	
In	 his	 lectures	 on	 descriptive	 psychology,	 Brentano	works	 out	 a	
version	of	the	variation	answer.23	Let’s	work	through	the	basic	tenets	
of	Brentano’s	proposal. 




Spencer,	 in	Psychologie.	 I	 assume	 that	 Spencer’s	Principles	 are	 the	 common	
source	of	James’s	and	Brentano’s	proposals.
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question	 arises	 for	 James.	 For	 his	 talk	 of	 variation	 is	 metaphorical.	
What	does	“variation”	of	elements	of	consciousness	amount	to?
Brentano’s	 examples	 suggest	 an	 answer.	 When	 the	 descriptive	
psychologist	 wants	 to	 notice	 her	 evident	 judging,	 she	 creates	
differences	 by	 either	 imagining	 or	 remembering	 cases	 of	 blind	



















descriptive	psychologist	 intentionally	 creates	differences	 in	order	 to	
notice	by	imagining	or	episodically	recalling	contrast	cases.
8. Why awareness can’t become observation









noticeable,	 and	we	 can	 come	 to	 acknowledge	A	 (C)	 as	 well	 as	 the	
whole	it	is	part	of.26 
Such	 contrasts	may	 simply	 come	 about	 in	 our	mental	 life	when	
one	 unified	 whole	 is	 followed	 by	 a	 different	 one.	 The	 descriptive	
psychologist	whose	 project	 is	 to	 notice	 the	 parts	 of	 her	mental	 life	
needs	to	intentionally	seek	out	and	create	such	contrasts.	Comparing	










difference	between	blind	and	evident	 judgements,	 and	 thereby	one	
comes	to	know	the	distinctive	features	of	evident	judgements.	He	goes	
on	to	comment:
The	 examples	which	 I	 have	 given	 in	 order	 to	 illustrate	
the	method	of	 comparison,	 the	distinctive	arrangement	
of	differences,	through which the implicitly perceived becomes 
explicitly noticeable,	can	of	course	be	multiplied	to	infinity.	
(1890/1,	54	[56].	My	translation	and	emphasis.)


















(1904,	 109)	 talks	 about	 emotional	 expectation	 (Gemütserwartung).	
Sometimes	 you	 feel	 that	 something	 is	 about	 to	 happen.	 Hence,	 in	








To	 sum	 up:	 Objects	 of	 outer	 perception	 can,	 while	 elements	 of	
consciousness	 can’t,	 be	 noticed	 without	 seeking	 out	 contrast	 cases.	
Hence,	 awareness	 cannot	 become	 observation.	 Observing	 one’s	
mental	life	always	requires	activities	that	are	different	from	awareness.	
Awareness	 is	 intrinsic	 to	 perceiving,	 but	 this	 intrinsic	 awareness	 is	













of	 our	 current	mental	 life.	We	 need	 to	 be	 aware	 of	 our	mental	 life	
and,	in	addition,	to	episodically	remember	or	imagine	contrast	cases	
to	notice	parts,	individual	activities,	in	it.	Awareness	cannot	become	
noticing,	 since	one	can’t	 satisfy	 the	desire	 to	notice	 the	elements	of	
one’s	mental	 life	only by continuing to be aware of them under improved 
conditions.	 Further	 activities	 in	 addition	 to	 awareness	 are	 required.	










drummer,	 I	 don’t	 need	 to	 seek	 out	 contrast	 cases.	 Observing	 him	
(watching	him)	is	seeing	him	out	of	interest	to	learn	about	him.	The	
change	 from	 seeing	 to	watching	 concerns	 the	desire	 that	motivates	
my	seeing.	When	one	watches	the	drummer,	one	still	sees	him;	seeing	
and	watching	are the same perceptual activity.	
Watching	 the	 drummer	 does	 not	 require	 seeking	 out	 contrast	
cases.	Why?	 The	 drummer	 stands	 out	 in	 our	 perception	 even	 if	 he	
28.	There	 are	 some	non-mental	 objects	 that	 are	 also	 only	 observable	 by	 com-
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perceiving	and	 its	objects	but	 in	a	position	 to	notice	only	 the	 latter.	







Brentano	has,	 then,	 a	 good	 reason	 to	 say	 that	 awareness	 cannot	
become	 observation.	 His	 reason	 is	 compatible	 with	 the	 view	 that	
the	descriptive	psychologist	can	develop	an	anatomy	of	 the	soul.	 In	
fact,	 considerations	 about	 the	 method	 of	 descriptive	 psychology	
help	to	show	why	awareness	cannot	be	observation.	Observation	of	
one’s	mental	 life	 requires	 the	 exercise	 of	memory	 and	 imagination	
in	seeking	out	contrast	cases.	One	can	observe	one’s	mental	life,	but	
one’s	observing	is	based	on,	but	does	not	consist	in,	awareness.	
9. Observation and time-consciousness
The	result	of	the	previous	section	is	that	observing	one’s	current	mental	
life	 cannot	 only	 consist	 in	 awareness.	 In	 later	 work	 Brentano	 goes	
















Brentano’s	 observation	 about	 the	 secondary	 object	 also	 explains	
why	 the	 secondary	 object,	 one’s	 total	 perceptual	 activity,	 goes	
unnoticed	when	one	perceives	something.	If	we	go	back	to	the	list	of	
objects	 in	James’s	example	(sect.	7),	we	see	that	 it	contains	physical	
objects	 like	 sounds	and	mental	phenomena	 like	 interests.	We	don’t	
perceive	a	sound	and	a	colour	together	and	are	conscious	of	hearing	
and	 seeing.	We	 are	 jointly	 aware	 of	 a	 sound,	 a	 colour,	 our	 hearing	
and	 our	 seeing.	 In	 Brentano’s	words:	 “In	 one	 and	 the	 same	mental	
phenomenon	in	which	the	tone	is	presented	we	apprehend	the	mental	




[O]riginally	 the	 totality	 of	 our	 consciousness	 may	
have	 been	 a	 confused	 unity	 in	which	 no	 single	 part	 is	
distinguished	from	another	one	and not even the physical 
and the mental that appears to us was distinguished.	 Later	
this	 is	 never	 completely	 the	 case;	 but	 depending	 on	






they	appear	 to	us	spatially	 located.	 In	contrast,	 the	mental	activities	
that	 are	parts	of	 this	 totality	don’t	 stand	out,	because	 they	 lack	 this	
feature.	 They	 are	 fused	with	 all	 other	 objects	 we	 are	 jointly	 aware	
of,	and	we	cannot	notice	them,	even	if	we	so	desire,	simply	by	being	
aware	 of	 them.	 Hence,	 when	 we	 perceive,	 we	 are	 co-aware	 of	 our	








mental	 phenomenon	 just	 as	 we	 can	 turn	 to	 a	 present	
physical	 phenomenon,	 and	 in	 this	 way	 we	 can,	 so	 to	
speak,	observe	it.	(1874,	49	[26].	In	part	my	translation.)
Now	 this	 argument	 rests	 on	 the	 controversial	 view	 that	 one	 can	
be	aware	only	of	present	mental	 acts.	 I	will	not	 try	 to	argue	 for	 (or	
against)	this	view.	For	even	if	we	can	be	aware	of	our	perceiving	etc.	
over	 time,	we	can	come	 to	 learn	more	about	 it	only	by	seeking	out	
contrasts	 in	 imagination	 and	memory,	 and	 hence,	 while	 awareness	
may	 be	 involved	 in	 observing	mental	 acts,	 it	 cannot	 constitute	 this	
observation.
10. Conclusion
Brentano	 provided	 independent	 reasons	 for	 the	 conclusion	 that	
awareness	 cannot	 become	 observation.	 This	 justifies	 privileging	
the	outer	object	of	a	perception	as	its	primary	object:	it	is	the	object	
that	can	be	observed	 in	one’s	perceiving.	 It	seems	to	us	 that	we	are	
aware	only	of	the	outer	object	and	not	of	the	perceiving	itself	because	
perception	 cannot	 be	 or	 become	 observation	 of	 itself.	 At	 the	 same	
time	Brentano’s	account	of	noticing	and	observation	has	room	for	an	














tended.	If I hear a melody, a succession of tones appears to me, 
not a succession of hearings.	[…]	This	gives	the	study	of	the	
act	with	respect	to	the	primary	object	special	preference.	
(Brentano	1906b,	378–9.	My	emphasis	and	translation.)
When	 you	 hear	 D,	 you	 also	 retain	 the	 previously	 heard	 note	 F	 in	
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